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Technology and Economic Performance: 
A Different View of the Federal Role 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
The pace of technological progress is a prime driving force in our increasingly global 
economy; government policy on technology needs to be reconsidered in that light. The United 
States is heavily reliant on the fruits of science and technology to provide its basic strength, 
both military and economic. Over the years, this nation has maintained its strong military 
posture, not by having the largest armed force, but by relying on the most technically 
sophisticated, up-to-date arsenal of weapons and equipment, and the technically trained people 
to operate them. 
Similarly, high-tech companies maintain a favorable balance of trade, while the low-
tech companies have suffered most severely from foreign competition (see Figure 1). R&D-
intensive industries also experience greater increases in productivity than the other sectors of 
the economy. Clearly, advances in technology are a key to the continuation of both the 
military and the economic power of the United States. 
What is not so apparent is the proper course for governmental policy toward 
technology, especially its use in the private sector. This report addresses the key issues that 
have to be faced in deciding that important federal role in fostering the development and use of 
technology. The sections that follow cover national competitiveness, existing science and 
technology policy, proposed support for commercially relevant technology, the proper 
boundary between government and private initiative, and the future role of the Department of 
Defense and other federal agencies. I 
Murray Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and Director of the 
Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis. This report 
draws heavily on his forthcoming book, Small Wars, Big Defense (Oxford University Press). 
The author is indebted to Kenneth Chilton, Arthur Denzau, and Bruce Petersen for helpful 













Trade Balances in Advanced Technology 





1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 




An important aspect of aggregate economic policy is to maintain an environment 
conducive for financing and performing commercially oriented technology. To judge by the 
numerical results, that necessary environment has been created in recent years, although not 
necessarily at the optimum level. In the two decades prior to 1980, the federal government 
was the number one funding source for R&D in the nation. In the 1980s, however, the private 
sector outspent the public sector on R&D (see Table 1). 
The implication of this shift from public to private sponsorship of R&D deserves more 
attention than it has received. First of all, it is noteworthy that the private sector has risen to 
dominance even though a rapid expansion in Defense Department funding of R&D occurred 
during much of the same period. Secondly, the change in relative importance of private versus 
public funding means that commercial needs, rather than government programs, now dictate 
the greater part of the work of American scientists and engineers. Although we cannot 
pinpoint the precise results, an enhanced flow of new products and improved production 
processes should occur in the private sector of the American economy during this decade as a 
result. 
Trade Trends 
In any event, the proponents of direct federal support for commercially relevant 
technology point to the large U.S. trade deficit as an indicator of a lack of national 
competitiveness. It is easy to show that the United States has lost its "supremacy" in the 
global economy in the four decades since the end of World War II. In 1950, the United States 
generated approximately 40 percent of the world's gross product and 17 percent of world 
trade. In the past few years, in striking contrast, the U.S. share of gross product has dropped 
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Historical analysis explains that shift quite readily. In 1950, the economies of Western 
Europe and Japan were still recovering from the devastation of World War II. Under those 
circumstances, the American economic giant had little difficulty dominating many world 
markets, particularly its own. Such a powerful position was bound to be transitory, however, 
as the economic competitors regained their traditional strength, with very substantial help from 
both the U.S. government and its citizens. In fact, by 1960, the U.S. share of world trade 
already had declined to 13 percent, approximately the current ratio. 
It is intriguing to note that the Soviet Union did not take as benign an attitude as the 
United States in the postwar period. It shackled the economies of defeated nations within the 
sphere of its control. The subsequent poor economic performance of all of the Eastern bloc 
economies is hardly a tribute to that approach. 
As James Schlesinger has noted, perhaps the United States should have done better in 
the period since World War II, "but we have not done all that badly."3 The United States 
remains the leading economic, political, and military power in the world. A recent survey of 
Japanese views reported that "the United States is still a vital nation with unchallenged military 
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power, the world's largest economy, an affluent lifestyle, and natural abundance that leaves 
resource-poor Japan in awe. "4 
The notion that the United States is in decline is simply inaccurate, in any absolute 
sense. The United States is not becoming poorer, and its economy is not weak or feeble. In 
1990, U.S. farms, mines, factories, and offices produced $5.5 trillion of goods and services-
a record high and double that of second-place Japan. At best (or worst) the proponents of the 
decline hypothesis are forced to rely on relative comparisons. 
This upbeat conclusion is not just the result of Americans patting themselves on their 
backs. Similar, and more strongly worded, sentiments were voiced by the managing director 
of Credit Europeen: 
Since the early eighties, after a decade of relative decline, the United States has 
clearly regained its rank as the leading economic and political superpower in 
the free world. Neither the erratic movements in the dollar exchange rate, nor 
the huge U.S. balance of payments deficit and foreign debt can reverse that 
judgment which is shared by a great majority of Europeans. s 
The Competitiveness Challenge 
The United States does not have a competitiveness problem, but faces a continuing 
competitiveness challenge. This distinction is not a quibble. American-produced goods and 
services are more than holding their own in world markets. Our merchandise exports rose 
from $224 billion in 1980 to $390 billion in 1990, a 74 percent increase over the decade. 
Inevitably, not every company is doing that well - while other enterprises are 
reporting results much above average. The political noise level is uneven among the two 
groups. The poor performers have every incentive to come to Washington in search of 
government help. The stronger companies, in contrast, are too busy designing, producing, and 
marketing their products to lobby for federal aid. 
The United States does have a large, albeit declining, trade deficit. Merchandise 
imports rose over the past decade at a more rapid rate than exports, approximately doubling 
from $250 billion in 1980 to $498 billion in 1990. In large measure, this reflects the fact that 
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the United States is a high-consuming, low-saving society. This is an important concern to 
economic policymakers, but it transcends the issue of competitiveness and technology. 
The triple-digit federal deficits have exerted a powerful, and negative, effect on the 
trade balance of the United States. For any nation, if domestic saving is inadequate to finance 
both capital formation and government borrowing, an inflow of foreign funds will result. The 
foreign funds are earned, in turn, by exporting more than trading partners are importing. 
Those U.S. budget deficits cannot be blamed on foreigners; they definitely have a made-in-
America label. 6 
To some degree, the high exchange rate value of the dollar in international trade in the 
early 1980s made imports especially cheap (and our exports relatively expensive). However, 
since the peak reached in early 1985, the value of the dollar has declined substantially, albeit 
irregularly. This change helps dampen our imports as well as encourage our exports, thus 
reducing the trade deficit. 
Some of the change in the U.S. trade position is cyclical. Our imports tend to decline 
with recession here, while our exports depend heavily on economic conditions overseas. Thus, 
a portion of the recent reduction in the overall trade deficit may be temporary. A renewal of 
economic growth in this country should exert an upward pressure on imports while economic 
weakness overseas may dampen exports. 
In any event, American industry continues to be challenged, in domestic as well as in 
foreign markets, by a growing variety of European and Asian companies. Some of these 
foreign competitors are benefitting from the diffusion of technology across the global economy. 
This is especially true in Asian-rim nations, such as Thailand and Malaysia, which are joining 
the ranks of rapidly developing nations. In other cases, the economic consolidation of the 
European Community is beginning to develop economies of scale and other efficiencies 
resulting from the elimination of numerous national barriers to commerce. 
In this global economy, American firms cannot rest on their oars . U.S. companies 
must continue to develop a competitive advantage through constant improvement of products 
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and manufacturing processes - which means in large part applying the results of science and 
technology. Nevertheless, the steady U.S. trade surplus in high-tech products belies the need 
for special government help because of a supposed lack of technological competitiveness (see 
Figure 2).7 
Existing Science and Technology Policy 
Given the great variety of missions assigned to federal agencies, it is difficult to 
identify precisely the nature of federal policy toward science and technology. In effect, that 
policy must be inferred by the expenditures and other actions of many different parts of the 
federal government. 
For example, several major departments of the federal government are large financial 
supporters of research and development, notably the Departments of Defense, Energy, and 
Health and Human Services. Altogether, federal departments and agencies financed $69 billion 
of R&D in 1990, almost one-half of all of the R&D performed in the United States. 
However, the President does not present an overall budget for R&D nor does Congress 
enact one. As in many other areas, such as education and retirement benefits, analysts must 
discover science and technology priorities indirectly -by adding up the many parts of 
departmental budgets that are devoted to research and development. 
In effect, therefore, a change in overall budget priorities can result in an inadvertent 
expansion - or reduction - in federal support for science and technology. 8 A shift from 
defense (with a very high R&D content) to entitlements (with no R&D component) will 
invariably mean a decrease in federal financing of R&D. As can be seen in Table 2, there is 
great variation in the R&D-intensity of federal agencies. 
However, it is difficult to identify any significant benefit from changing the way that 
the Executive Branch and the Congress traditionally budget mission-oriented R&D. The 
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Table 2 
Federal Agency R & D and Total Outlays in 1988 
R&D Total R&D 
Outlays Outlays Percentage 
Department or Agency (in billions) of Total 
Above-average R&D Ratios 
National Science Foundation $1.5 $1.9 78.9% 
NASA 4.8 9.1 52.7 
Energy Department 5.1 10.5 48.6 
Commerce Department .4 2.5 16.0 
Defense Department (military) 36.5 299.6 12.2 
Interior Department .4 5.4 8.2 
Environmental Protection Agency .4 4.9 7.4 
Below-average R&D Ratios 
Agriculture Department 1.0 50.7 2.0 
Health and Human Services Department 7.1 375.1 1.9 
Transportation Department .3 26.3 1.1 
Veterans Affairs Department .2 27.6 .7 
Agency for International Development .1 5.2 .2 
All other .7 237.1 .3 
Total: Federal Government $58.5 $1055.9 5.5% 
Source: Compiled from data prepared by the U.S. National Science Foundation and the Office 
of Management and Budget. 
position to determine how much and what kind of R&D is needed to carry out the national 
defense mission. Ditto for the Departments of Agriculture, Transportation, etc. There is no 
need for a "master plan" of total federal R&D. NASA should not expand its activities just 
because some official in the White House is anxious to support technology. 
But, as a practical matter, neither Congress nor the Executive Branch should blithely 
ignore the adverse effects the major defense cutbacks that are underway will have on the size 
and composition of R&D performed in the United States. Basic research merits special 
attention because of a limiting char cteristic: the organization doing the work cannot prevent 
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others from benefitting from the results; indeed, public policy encourages the widest use of this 
type of "public good." Thus, business firms tend to underinvest in this category of R&D. The 
desirable response is not to grant the Defense Department a special budget for basic research, 
but to provide offsetting increases to such civilian-oriented agencies as the National Science 
Foundation. 
Proposed Support for Commercially 
Relevant Technology 
There are few, if any, advocates of socialism in the federal government. However, 
people often want to add a "teeny weeny" bit of government guidance to help the business 
system work better. Over the years, numerous government subsidies have been enacted.9 
Most of these interventions in the private sector - farm subsidies, shipping subsidies, credit 
subsidies, synthetic-fuel subsidies - have been shown to be wasteful or outright 
counterproductive. Despite their surface attractiveness, proposals for direct government 
support of commercially relevant technology fall into this category. Government has 
demonstrated no capacity for choosing among promising new technologies. Witness the space 
shuttle still seeking to define its mission or the financially hemorrhaging superconducting super 
collider. 
Past experience with government trying to force technological innovation is not 
comforting. The billions of dollars that the federal government wasted in the abortive attempt 
to develop a commercial synthetic-fuels industry was part of a vain effort to reduce our 
dependence on imported energy.lO Unfortunately, it is only the latest example of the basic 
failure of "industrial policy" efforts that extend back to the days of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation scandals in the 1950s.ll 
Thus, it is easy to answer the question: "How would the government decide which 
industries, technologies, and projects to support?" On the basis of experience, government 
will favor politically powerful firms, which usually means older, labor-intensive companies. 
Over the years, these firms have invested substantial amounts of resources in improving their 
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presence in Washington. Moreover, these firms are the "squeaky wheels," suffering the most 
from competitive forces. 
New and growing firms may be economically strong, but they usually are politically 
weak. They possess neither a record of extended financial contributions to political candidates 
nor a detailed knowledge of lobbying techniques nor a large group of agitated 
employees/voters. The result is a very uneven contest that favors old-line businesses over new 
enterprises, and old technology over new. Former Senator William Proxmire was fond of 
saying, "Money will go where the political power is. Anyone who thinks government funds 
will be allocated to firms according to merit has not lived or served in Washington very long." 
To be fair, it should be noted that every business going to Washington for financial 
help detests and resents the term "subsidy." Their executives always describe what they seek 
as an investment in future economic growth or some such worthy pursuit. Each supplicant 
industry fervently believes in competition, especially on the part of its suppliers. But when 
other companies attempt to sell similar products at lower prices or better products at the same 
price, that is "unfair competition" or "predatory pricing" or, worse yet, "foreigners capturing 
our markets." Thus, supposedly government needs to respond. 
The U.S. -Japanese semiconductor agreement illustrates the danger that such rhetoric 
creates. The agreement surely helped some firms, but at the expense of the U.S. computer 
manufacturing industry. The results are typical of special-interest legislation, benefitting some 
industry or company or region, but at the expense of the national interest. 
As recently as the early 1980s, the U.S. semiconductor industry outsold Japanese 
firms. Japanese companies responded by investing more heavily than their American 
counterparts - at a time when U.S. firms could have afforded to stay ahead of the foreign 
competition. Not surprisingly, by the middle 1980s, Japanese semiconductor producers began 
to outsell U.S. firms.l2 Today, the American companies are asking for a generous handout 
from the taxpayer. That would be an unjustified reward for poor business judgment. It also 
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would be a terrible precedent that other companies would be encouraged to follow. The 
answer should be clear: "Sorry fellows, welfare is for poor people." 
A more fundamental response to the advocates of direct federal support for 
commercially oriented science and technology is that such outlays would be unfair to the many 
other companies that pay the taxes to finance these subsidies and who would see the money go 
to their competitors. Nevertheless, it is necessary to respond to the concern that society as a 
whole may underinvest in applied research and development because of various imperfections 
in the market economy. For example, potential entrepreneurs and financiers of new high-tech 
ventures may lack adequate information about the opportunities in and returns from such 
investments. Indeed, studies show that the overall returns on applied research and 
development are quite high in relation to traditional economic activity .13 
Under the circumstances, government action to lower the private sector's decision-
making threshold on R&D would be useful, provided it would be done in a manner that 
preserves the entrepreneurial nature of the individual firm's decision making (this would not be 
the case with large-scale direct subsidies). 
An alternative to expenditure subsidies is available and it would be more equitable and 
more effective: the federal government should provide generalized tax incentives for private-
sector investment, including such activities as R&D. There are several attractions of this 
approach. It would be available to all private companies that pay U.S. income taxes. Those 
private companies receiving the incentive would choose the projects they wish to undertake. 
Finally and most relevant, the private firms doing the R&D would continue to bear most of the 
financial risk; the government's share would be much smaller. 
A reduction in the corporate income tax would be a fundamental change. Such action 
would lower the cost of capital to American business and thereby lengthen the time horizon for 
economically attractive investments in R&D and capital equipment. 
Alternatively, the existing R&D tax credit could be improved. Researchers in this 
field continue to debate the benefits and costs of the existing R&D tax credit.1 4 There is one 
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aspect, however, that is not controversial: the reluctance of Congress to enact this provision 
on a permanent basis sharply reduces its effectiveness. Grudgingly extending the credit a year 
or two at a time makes it much less likely that companies will take account of this incentive in 
their decision making on long-range commitments to R&D, such as building expensive new 
laboratories. 
The Proper Boundary between Government 
and Private Initiative 
Much of the pressure for more federal subsidies of private business, including its use 
of science and technology, comes from citing the example ofJapan. Japan's Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) is often heralded as a fine example of successful 
business-government cooperation, but the details are not as convincing. MITI tried to keep 
Mazda and Honda out of the auto business because it badly underestimated the growth of 
Japan's export market. Then there was MITI's textile fiasco. MITI bought and scrapped 
180,000 looms to finance the textile cartel that it set up. At the same time, however, 160,000 
illegal looms came into production. In fact, more textile companies were operating in Japan 
after MITI's efforts than before.15 
On a more positive note, the Japanese response since 1987 to the rising yen in world 
currency markets is very revealing. On their own, Japanese companies took quick and tough 
actions to restore their global competitiveness. Within weeks, or at most months, of the 
change in the external financial environment, many of them adopted vigorous campaigns to 
improve productivity. Efforts to upgrade quality were made. Some manufacturing operations 
were quickly moved to lower-cost locations and, in some cases, senior executives reduced their 
own salaries. MITI was not particularly involved at all. 
In any event, U.S. policy should be based on U.S. institutions and experience. Thus, 
there is a modest role for government in connection with commercially oriented technology, 
such as operating a patent office and setting technical standards. Basically, under our private 
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enterprise form of economy, the private sector makes the decisions as to where to invest, what 
risks to take, and what technologies to spur and which to discard. 
Government can - and should - facilitate the flow of technology from the laboratory 
to the commercial marketplace by creating a favorable economic climate. That role can stand 
considerable improvement. 
To start with, government should reduce the numerous government-erected obstacles 
which discourage private firms from investing in risky long-term ventures. As is well known, 
a basic way of reducing the cost of long-term investments is to lower the cost of capital (which 
over the years has been higher in the United States than in Japan). The most direct way for the 
federal government to do that is to reduce the extent to which the Treasury competes for the 
limited supply of private saving via deficit financing. 
The task here is more than a simple-minded reduction in budget deficits. Some 
approaches - such as tax increases which reduce the funds available for private investment -
would do more harm than good. In contrast, bringing down the deficit by curtailing the 
government's consumption-oriented outlays would be a real plus. 
Moreover, numerous regulatory restrictions inhibit the growth of corporate R&D. 
After all, what good would it do for the federal government to pour vast sums into high-tech 
enterprises if at the same time federal, state, and local governments erect statutory and 
administrative roadblocks to the application of new technology? 
The fact is that the deregulating trend of the late 1970s and early 1980s has been 
replaced by a major expansion of government regulation of business.16 Consider America's 
world-class pharmaceutical industry, which generates a substantial excess of exports over 
imports. Congressional committees are responding to that positive situation by "cracking 
down" on the industry via proposed new legislation that would grant the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration police powers unprecedented for a regulatory agency .17 Any effect on the flow 
of new technology resulting from this "crackdown" is bound to be negative, especially since 
the committees seem oblivious to such impacts of their actions. 
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It is intriguing to note that, in a large number of cases - chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
and biotechnology - the potential supply of venture capital appears to be quite adequate. The 
major constraints on commercializing the advances in technology arise from government 
actions.lS The hysterical reaction to the use of the protein BST in increasing the production of 
milk is, unfortunately, not a unique experience. Witness the spectacle of "consumer 
advocates" vehemently opposing the move because it would reduce the price of milk- and 
state legislatures following their lead by preventing the use of this advance in biotechnology. 
Because many regulatory agencies exempt existing facilities, products, and processes 
from their directives, the main burden of rapidly expanding regulation falls on new enterprises, 
new undertakings, and new technology. The concern over the proper federal role in promoting 
new technology should extend to at least reducing if not eliminating many of those new 
burdens. 
There is a modest direct role for government in supporting commercially oriented 
technology and, here too, some reforms would be desirable.19 For example, a simpler and 
more effective patent system would encourage the creation and diffusion of technology. Such a 
change would ensure that smaller inventors are not overwhelmed by the cost of obtaining 
patents and defending them against legal challenges. Also, larger firms would be encouraged 
to seek patents rather than protecting their new products and processes by maintaining secrecy. 
In addition, revisions in the antitrust laws are needed to avoid impeding the formation 
of joint ventures to develop new technology. Often, the capital requirements to develop what 
is termed "generic" or "pre-competitive" technology are beyond the financial capability of a 
single firm. Waiving or amending the antitrust statutes would be a far more sensible approach 
than urging the federal government to provide the necessary financial support. 
The Future Role of Defense 
and Other Federal Agencies 
The question has been raised as to the role of the Department of Defense in promoting 
commercial competitiveness. The direct role, properly, should be zero. A potential indirect 
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role might be quite constructive, both for the military and civilian sectors: it is for the 
Pentagon and the Congress to reduce the obstacles to military procurement of state-of-the-art 
products available in commercial markets.20 
Some historical perspective on developments in military R&D and its relation to the 
civilian sector is necessary. For much of the period since the end of World War II, the 
scientific and technological efforts of the U.S. military establishment have set the pace for the 
American economy. The Department of Defense has been a major financier of R&D as well as 
the largest purchaser and developer of new scientific applications. In the absence of an explicit 
federal technology policy in the 1950s and the 1960s, the practices of the Pentagon became, to 
a very large extent, the de facto U.S. technology policy. 
Past spinoffs from military technology constitute an impressive group - computers, jet 
airliners, composite materials, communications equipment, and scientific instruments. For 
decades, many companies primarily oriented to civilian markets benefitted from commercial 
use of "spin offs" from high-powered defense research and development. 
Indeed, for much of the period since the end of World War II, a major attraction of 
defense work was the ability of commercial firms to keep abreast of the latest developments in 
military science and technology. The Raytheon Corporation adapted radar technology to 
develop the microwave oven (first called the "Radarange"). Boeing drew on its military 
aircraft design work on the B-47 and KC-135 in developing the 707 commercial airliner, 
although the 707 and the KC-135 were both descended from a common company-sponsored 
prototype (the "dash 80"). 
Over the past decade, the relationship between military and civilian R&D has changed 
very substantially. The roles of the public and private sectors often have been reversed in the 
military sphere itself. If a technology has both civilian and military use, the more advanced 
models are more likely now to be seen in Radio Shack than in military systems. 
Dr. William Perry, former Undersecretary of Defense, cites the example of 
semiconductors, where the differences between defense and commercial technologies are not 
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very great. Extremely detailed military specifications have isolated defense production, 
dividing the U.S. industrial base between defense and commercial uses. Perry believes that, 
due to the rigidity of military specifications and requirements, chips made for the Defense 
Department are 10 times more expensive and nearly two generations behind their commercial 
counterparts. 21 
Many currently deployed defense systems use technologies dating to the 1970s or 
earlier. The existing acquisition process, which often requires as much as 20 years to move a 
major weapon system from R&D to deployment, increases costs and limits technological 
innovation. This drawn out development process also reduces the return on contractor-
financed investments in defense R&D and thus reduces the incentives for such undertakings.22 
The B-2 Stealth bomber and the Seawolf submarine both have computer chips in key 
components that are merely run-of-the-mill, rather than the latest state-of-the-art. The design 
of electronic parts in these weapons had to be frozen years ago in order to meet the 
requirements of the lengthy military production cycle. But, since then, the civilian computer 
industry has continued to innovate at a rapid pace. 
Increasingly, the ability of the armed services to develop advanced weaponry depends 
on how well they and their contractors can "spin on" civilian advances to military products. 
Military research in electronics, for example, is now so exotic and slow that it offers little 
commercial use. The tables have turned. DOD has become a net user of civilian research.23 
Many barriers impede the transfer of advanced technology from the civilian economy 
to the military establishment. The military acquisition process has become increasingly 
cumbersome, costly, and onerous. To prevent their civilian-oriented divisions from becoming 
"contaminated" by the military's bureaucratic approach, many companies selling to the armed 
services go out of their way to insulate their military work. 
Thus, fiber optics companies doing business with the Department of Defense have set 
up special divisions to do so. In that way, the military's special accounting, auditing, and 
personnel requirements do not apply to the rest of the company. In the case of computer 
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software, the Department of Defense has set up a standard for weapons, committing itself to 
use of software written in its Ada computer language whenever possible. As a consequence, 
the software industry increasingly is being divided into separate civilian and military sectors 
and innovations in one sector are not quickly transferred to the other. 
Some regulatory changes can help. Because American technology is increasingly 
oriented to civilian needs, federal acquisition regulations should be modified to encourage, or 
at least permit, the defense establishment to economize on its spending by drawing more on 
commercial product developments. That, of course, is much easier said than done. 
The people in the Pentagon who make a career out of writing military specifications 
can be expected to object to any attempt to buy more off-the-shelf commercial products, 
whether they provide the DOD with superior technology or not. Such a shift in government 
purchasing on a large scale would put many regulation writers and acquisition reviewers out of 
work. 
Also, "Buy American" provisions of the federal procurement laws inhibit purchasing 
from the open market. Officials responsible for acquisition must carefully check whether any 
one of the numerous components of a product contains a single forbidden foreign element. 
Other obstacles to buying more off-the-shelf commercial products include the rules on steering 
a certain percentage of procurement to small, handicapped, and minority firms and the onerous 
"do-it-by-the-numbers" provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act. 
Some suggestions for utilizing the results of civilian R&D in military activities would 
go much further than merely liberalizing procurement procedures. When they view the 
absolute size of the military budget (even after the currently contemplated reductions), many 
people who are concerned with the lagging international competitiveness of American industry 
see a new source of financing for their proposals. That is, they would have the Department of 
Defense directly finance civilian technology. 
Some who urge the Department of Defense to subsidize civilian science and technology 
use as a justification the fact that the armed services are important users of society's pool of 
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scientific and technical knowledge. 24 But there is no limit to that line of reasoning, given the 
large military purchases of items ranging from missiles to mittens, from ground support 
equipment to golf balls. 
Lewis Branscomb, Director of the Science Technology and Public Policy Program at 
Harvard, warns, moreover, that defense R&D tends to be too slow, too centralized, and too 
micro-managed to be transferred successfully to the private sector. Defense researchers tend to 
be too far removed from the product development process of private industry and from 
commercial markets to have much impact. 25 
These concerns have led to proposals to expanding the role of the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) as a convenient way of bypassing traditional military 
procurement procedures. Little known and small in size by Washington, D.C., standards, 
DARPA awards contracts totalling over $1 billion each year to over 300 corporations and 
universities to conduct high-risk research. Over the past 30 years, DARPA-funded projects 
have led to the development and commercialization of computer time-sharing, advanced 
aeronautics, new types of software and new telecommunications procedures. 
DARPA already is financing private sector R&D in a variety of areas -
superconductivity, advanced semiconductors, high-definition television (HDTV), and very 
sophisticated types of integrated circuits. While DARPA justifies its sponsorship of these 
projects because of their expected relevance to military missions, many of the technologies 
being developed are expected to help American industries compete in commercial markets. 
About one-half of DARPA's budget is currently allocated to such dual-use technologies that 
have both civilian and military applications.26 
However, DARPA has experienced its share of flops. After spending $200 million, it 
closed the books on an experimental helicopter-airplane. Another project that fell short was a 
scheme to use artificial intelligence to guide a combat vehicle over rough terrain.27 
Some compare DARPA with the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI). Unlike DARPA, MITI is a cabinet-level agency charged with the broader mission of 
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enhancing the nation's international competitiveness. Expanding the role of DARPA to include 
all of the civilian technology that other federal departments and agencies are willing to 
sponsor, as is now being urged, would dilute DARPA's mission and weaken its focus. To a 
significant degree, DARPA has succeeded by virtue of its ability to bypass much of the 
Pentagon bureaucracy. If it gets much larger, it likely would lose that special characteristic. 
A more fundamental objection to using the military budget to support private sector 
technology is that it will politicize the process. Giving the Department of Defense- rather 
than the marketplace - the authority to choose which technologies and which firms to receive 
its funds provides opportunity and incentive for exerting political pressures. History tells us 
that such opportunities will not go unused for long. 
We need to go no further than the Army Corps of Engineers for an illustration of this 
concern. The Corps' military functions are first rate. Its civilian dam building, in contrast, is 
embroiled in politics and generates numerous projects with little economic justification. The 
Corps' sorry record of generating "pork" for powerful legislators is hardly a precedent to 
justify expanding the promotional role of the Department of Defense in the civilian economy. 
Rather than having the Defense Department serve as an agency of industrial policy, 
some analysts have urged that the role be given to a strengthened Department of Commerce to 
invest more heavily in the development of the nation's technology base. Indeed, in late 1988, 
Congress converted the staid old National Bureau of Standards into the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST). The expanded agency is gearing up to hand out $10 
million in seed money to the private sector to develop high-tech proposals in areas ranging 
from fire prevention to HDTV. Current proposals being considered in Congress would raise 
NIST's subsidy kitty to $250 million a year by 1992. That approach- where a federal 
civilian agency determines which new areas of commercial technology will be subsidized by 
government- is only marginally better than giving the role to the Pentagon. 
However, none of these proposals for greater federal financing of civilian technology 
deals with the fundamental conditions that encourage investments in civilian technology -
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such as lower cost of capital and expanding economic opportunities. To the contrary, the 
increase in budget deficits - and in Treasury borrowing in financial markets - resulting from 
these ambitious spending plans would make it more difficult to achieve those favorable 
conditions. 
The justification for receiving government handouts are, on occasion, quite ingenious. 
According to a former Commerce Department official, business executives do not advocate an 
industrial policy; "they want the government involved in high-risk, long-term, expensive, high-
technology research projects. "28 Or, in the words of one academic supporter, "The 
government should not give handouts, but it should help strategically placed industries at 
strategic times. "29 But inevitably the political process would decide which "high-risk, long-
term," "strategic" industries and projects are to be selected. The lucky few chosen would, by 
definition, meet those subjective requirements. Politically weak companies by default would 
not be "strategic" or "high-risk" or "long-term." The results would be indistinguishable from 
a federal spending program formally labeled "industrial policy." 
Conclusion 
There are many important tasks that only government can perform, ranging from 
ensuring the national security to providing a system of justice. But one thing that democratic 
political systems cannot do well at all is to make critical choices between particular firms and 
competing technologies. 
A far more satisfying answer to the desire to generate a higher level of technological 
effort in the private sector than government subsidy is to reduce the existing obstacles facing 
high-tech firms in the American economy. Many of the barriers to commercializing 
technology, it turns out, have been erected by governmental policies in the tax, regulatory, and 
antitrust areas. It is foolish to attempt to offset those negative effects through another round of 
federal spending. 
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Governmental policymakers must learn to refrain from jumping every time a 
constituency asks for help. The current pressure to "do more" for the promotion of technology 
is not an exceptional case. The most cursory examination of past and current large-scale 
efforts of the federal government to promote the use of civilian science and technology does 
not inspire confidence in the ability of federal agencies to choose among alternative 
technologies and their uses. 
Identifying new shortcomings in the private sector does not automatically justify 
another round of governmental intervention in the economy. The well-publicized "market 
failure" may be overshadowed by even larger "government failure." Perhaps the best response 
to government officials who want to solve problems in the market economy is to reply, 
"Physician, heal thyself." 
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